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This paper derives a DSGE currency union model with labor market frictions, real wage
rigidities and price staggering. The model combines many realistic features, but it is still
tractable: like standard open-economy models, it can be closed in six equations. We derive
and discuss the constrained e¢ cient allocation and the decentralised equilibrium, under
both ￿ exible and sticky prices. We use the model to analyse how di⁄erent labor market
institutions or degrees of real wage rigidities in￿ uence the functioning of the currency
union and the size and persistence of in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials. We show that the
presence of non trivial real imperfections a⁄ects substantially the transmission mechanism
of shocks in general and, in particular, of monetary policy. Interestingly, we ￿nd that the
implications of real wage rigidities and labor market frictions for business cycle ￿ uctuations
are likely to operate in opposite directions: a high degree of real wage rigidities tends to
amplify the response of the real economy to shocks; when labor market are more sclerotic,
instead, unemployment volatility tends to decrease while in￿ ation volatility increases.
JEL Classi￿cation: E32, E52, F41
Keywords: Currency Union, labor market frictions, real wage rigidities, unemployment,
sticky prices, in￿ ation di⁄erentials1 Introduction
Seven years after the launch of the Euro, participating countries still face important eco-
nomic challenges. Economic growth has been quite disappointing. Structural unemploy-
ment is still high and labor force participation low. In￿ ation and output di⁄erentials are
quite large and, more importantly, very persistent over time.
Following the seminal contribution by Mundell (1963), the structure of labor markets
has often been seen as a crucial element in determining the costs and bene￿ts of partic-
ipating in a currency area. The old Mundell wisdom states that it may be very costly
to abandon the devaluation tool when labor does not move easily and prices and wages
are sticky. Adverse country-speci￿c shocks, in this case, may trigger a long and painful
adjustment process of low growth and rising unemployment, until the equilibrium is re-
stored. Indeed, looking at Europe today, the general impression is that many States and
politicians may have understated the economic costs of entering in a monetary union.
Three main elements seem to characterize European labor markets. First, unemploy-
ment is high and tends to be prolonged over time. As Blanchard notes in a recent paper,
￿being unemployed in Europe has always been a di⁄erent experience from being unem-
ployed in the United States (...) and has become increasingly so over time￿ 1. Second,
real wages seem to be rather in￿ exible. ￿Unemployment does eventually put some down-
ward pressure on real wages in Europe, but a large share of the adjustment is borne by
employment￿(Mongelli 2002, p. 18). Third, labor market institutions are widely hetero-
geneous across countries, and this is likely to in￿ uence the functioning and performances
of European economies. Indeed, the notion that labor market rigidities are at the core of
European unemployment problem has now become widely accepted among policy makers.
Recent research, by integrating labor market frictions ￿￿ la Mortensen-Pissarides (1994)￿
in otherwise standard closed-economy New Keynesian (NK) models, has shown that the
structure of labor markets in￿ uences substantially the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy and, more generally, the overall adjustment of economic activity to shocks2.
Labor market institutions are, in fact, an important determinant of the dynamics of real
wages and of marginal costs of ￿rms, which are in turn the main drivers of in￿ ation. Specif-
ically, it has been shown that the introduction of search and matching frictions ￿modi￿es
the nature of real marginal costs faced by ￿rms in a way that lowers the elasticity of
marginal costs to output and thus help to account for the observed inertia in in￿ ation
and persistence in output￿(Trigari 2005, p. 2). These results seem to suggest that the
introduction of a more realistic labor market structure is needed in order to overcome
some of the well-known weaknesses of the basic NK framework3.
1Blanchard, ￿European Unemployment: The Evolution of Facts and Ideas￿(2005, p. 6). The author
notices that the proportion of long-term unemployment and unemployment￿ s average duration are much
larger in Europe than in the US. For instance, average duration, which in the US is around three months,
in France stands over a year.
2Several authors have introduced a search model for the labor market in otherwise standard NK models.
The main message is that labor market frictions and institutions matter for monetary policy. See, among
others, Walsh(2005), Trigari(2005), Christo⁄el and Linzert(2005), Krause and Lubik (2005).
3See, e.g., Abbritti et al. (2006) for a discussion. The introduction of labor market imperfections allows
one to overcome three main shortcomings of the basic NK model: 1) the absence of involuntary unemploy-
ment; 2) the lack of a meaningfull trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation stabilization and output gap stabilization;
1A few currency union models have been proposed in recent years4. Building on the
standard NK framework, these models typically combine two ￿Keynesian￿features - mo-
nopolistic competition in the goods markets and price stickyness - and Walrasian labor
markets. The latter assumption has crucial implications. In fact, it implies that these
models are unable to explain movements in involuntary unemployment: as workers are al-
ways on their supply curves, changes in hours of work or employment are only voluntary.
Moreover, this assumption is at the heart of one key feature of the standard NK model,
that is the lack of a trade-o⁄ between in￿ ation stabilization and output gap stabilization.
This in turn implies that, at the union level, some form of in￿ ation targeting is optimal or
nearly optimal5. Finally, it must be noticed that, by assuming perfectly competitive labor
markets, we are implicitely ignoring a fundamental source of asymmetry among member
countries, that is the wide heterogeneity in European labor market institutions.
In a very recent paper, Campolmi and Faia (2006) are the ￿rst to integrate labor
markets frictions ￿￿ la Mortensen-Pissarides￿into a DSGE currency union model. The
currency union consists of two regions sharing the same currency and is characterized by a
variety of frictions: matching frictions and wage rigidity in the labor market, monopolistic
competition and price rigidity in the goods market. The result is a rich and quite complex
model, which needs to be studied through calibration and simulations. The paper aims at
studying the quantitative importance of labor market di⁄erences in generating di⁄erential
in￿ ation dynamics across euro area countries. Its complexity, however, makes it di¢ cult
to characterize analitically the solution and does not permit any normative analysis.
The aim of the present paper is to develop a tractable currency union model that ￿ts
the European empirical evidence and derive some policy implications. To this purpose, the
model combines three key ingredients: (i) monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities
￿￿ la Calvo￿in the goods market, which serve to give a role to monetary policy; (ii) labor
market rigidities ￿￿ la Howitt (1988)￿ , which generate involuntary unemployment; (iii) real
wage rigidities, which hinder wage adjustments and shift the labor market adjustment from
prices to quantities.
Following Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006) and Abbritti et al. (2006), we model labor market
imperfections in a very simple way. Drawing from Howitt (1988), we assume that ￿rms
face hiring costs which increase with the degree of labor market tightness6. Blanchard and
Gal￿ (2006) show how introducing hiring costs in a standard NK model results in a model
simple enough ￿that its solution can be characterized analytically, the dynamic e⁄ects of
shocks can be related to the underlying parameters, and optimal monetary policy can be
derived￿ 7. Abbritti et al. (2006) argue, in an independent work, that a NK model with
hiring costs, while being considerably simpler, is able to generate dynamics that are very
similar to the one of much more complex model which integrate nominal rigidities and
3) the great di¢ culty of the basic NK model in replicating the large and persistent response of output
together with the sticky dynamics of in￿ ation after nominal shocks.
4See, among others, Benigno (2004), Monacelli and Gal￿ (2005), Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002).
5See, e.g., Blanchard and Gal￿ (2005) for a discussion.
6As in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006), labor market tightness is de￿ned as the ratio of hires to the unem-
ployment pool.
7Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006), p. 34.
2search models for the labor market.
Using this very simple modelling of the labor market, we develop a currency union
model that incorporates many realistic features, but is still tractable. Interestingly, the
model can be reduced to a six-equation model - like standard open-economy models. We
regard the tractability of our framework as the key advantage of our approach.
The model provides a rigorous framework for the study of the potential causes of
in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials and, more generally, for the analysis of the funtioning
of a currency union characterized by pervasive nominal and real rigidities. Moreover, it
permits to study how di⁄erent labor market institutions in￿ uence the dynamic behaviour
of the member countries. Speci￿cally, we study how labor market rigidities in￿ uence
the dynamic behaviour of the member countries in response to three types of shocks:
two asymmetric supply shocks (wage and productivity shocks) and one common demand
shock (the monetary policy shock). We ￿rst explain the behaviour of the economy under
the simple and highly special case of a currency union composed by symmetric countries.
We then introduce some elements of asymmetry, considering ￿rst the impact of di⁄erent
degrees of real wage rigidities and then analysing what happens when the member countries
are characterised by di⁄erent labor market institutions.
Several interesting results emerge. First, when monetary policy is exclusively focused
on in￿ ation stabilisation, asymmetric wage or productivity shocks may have very long-
lasting e⁄ects on unemployment, both at the country level and at the union level. The
introduction of non trivial real imperfections creates, as in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2005), a
meaningfull trade-o⁄between in￿ ation stabilization and output gap stabilization. Second,
even when the countries have similar structures, transitory asymmetric shocks can lead to
large and long-lasting in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials. The size of these di⁄er-
entials is in￿ uenced by the degree of real wage rigidities and by labor market institutional
parameters. Third, when member countries have di⁄erent labor market fundamentals,
symmetric policy shocks can have substantial asymmetric e⁄ects and lead to large di⁄er-
entials. Fourth and most importantly, not all sources of rigidity have the same e⁄ects: it
does make a di⁄erence whether the rigidity lies in the wage determination mechanism or
in the labor market structure. When the rigidity lies in the wage determination mech-
anism, real wages cannot fully adjust and shocks tend to be absorbed through changes
in quantities - unemployment in our case. A higher degree of real wage rigidities thus
ampli￿es the response of the real economy to shocks. When the rigidity lies in the labor
market, it is more costly for ￿rms to hire new workers and therefore unemployment does
not vary as much as it would in a more ￿ exible economy8. A country characterised by
more sclerotic labor markets is thus likely to experience a smaller unemployment volatil-
ity. In other words, real wage rigidities and labor market imperfections are likely to have
opposite e⁄ects on business cycle ￿ uctuations. This is a very intuitive result, since (loosely
speaking) in the ￿rst case the rigidity is in ￿prices￿ , while in the second are ￿quantities￿
that cannot adjust.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews and
8We de￿ne a labor market as ￿sclerotic￿ when it is characterized by low job-￿nding and separations
rates.
3discuss some stylised facts on in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials in the Euro area. Section
3 is devoted to the building blocks of the model. Three di⁄erent equilibrium allocations
are derived: the constrained e¢ cient, the ￿ exible prices and the sticky prices allocations.
Section 4 derives the constrained-e¢ cient allocation, and shows that, under a standard
parametrization, productivity shocks have no e⁄ect on unemployment. The fact that the
welfare-relevant employment level is invariant to shocks considerably simplify the analysis,
since it permits to say that all employment ￿ uctuations are ine¢ cient. Section 5 describes
the decentralised equilibrium under ￿ exible prices while Section 6 introduces nominal
rigidities. The model is not solvable in closed-form, and to make progress requires log-
linearizing the system. The dynamics of the model around the steady state are presented
and discussed in Section 7. Section 8 describes the baseline calibration. Section 9 analyses
the functioning of the currency union under di⁄erent degrees of labor market rigidities
or real wage rigidities. Finally, Section 10 compares the outcomes of di⁄erent monetary
policy rules and Section 11 concludes.
2 The Implications of a Suboptimal Currency Area
The European Monetary Union is not yet an optimal currency area. The empirical evi-
dence suggests that labor mobility is low, prices and wages are sticky, and the labor and
product markets are characterized by pervasive structural rigidities9. According to the Op-
timal Currency Area Theory, the presence of such rigidities hinder the adjustment process
of member countries to changing economic conditions, as country-speci￿c shocks can only
be absorbed through a long and painful process of low growth and high unemployment.
Indeed, the ￿rst seven years of the Euro seem to con￿rm this old intuition.
In￿ ation and output di⁄erentials, which re￿ ect the e¢ ciency of the adjustment process
inside a currency union, are a big concern for policy-makers10. Fig. 1 shows the evolutions
of in￿ ation, output growth and of the current account in the ￿big four￿countries of the
euro area. In￿ ation and output growth di⁄erentials among Euro area countries are not
unusually large, but they are very persistent11. As a result of lasting in￿ ation di⁄erentials,
a number of EMU economies are experiencing a sizeable loss of external price competitive-
ness vis-￿-vis their peers12. Inevitably, overvaluation leads to low output growth, rising
unemployment and large current account de￿cits (almost ten percent in Spain and Por-
tugal). Large current account de￿cits - as well as large debt levels - pose the problem of
9See, e.g., Mongelli (2002) and ECB (2005) for some evidence.
10See, e.g., ECB (2003 and 2005), Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004), Benalal, Diaz del Hoyo, Pierluigi and
Vidalis (2006) for some evidence on in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials and for analyses of the potential
causes and policy implications.
11It must be noticed that in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials are not undesirable per se, as they are a
part of the equilibrating adjustment process inside the monetary union. Whether they are desirable or
not depends on the causes of such di⁄erentials. In fact, in￿ ation di⁄erentials may also be the product
of ￿misaligned ￿scal policies, diverging wage developments and deep-seated structural ine¢ ciencies such
as nominal and real rigidities in product and factor markets (ECB 2005, p.61)￿ . The persistence of such
di⁄erentials together with the empirical evidence on wage/price rigidities and on market imperfections,
suggest that a large part of these divergences may indeed be ine¢ cient and avoidable.
12This problem concerns, to di⁄erent degrees, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. See, e.g., Wyplosz
(2006) and Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry (2006) for a discussion.
4the vulnerability of certain countries to sudden stops of capital ￿ ows and/or to ￿nancial
crises.









































The traditional way to cope with a competitiveness problem is the devaluation of the
exchange rate, but this is made impossible by Euro area membership. As Blanchard
(2006) notes, there is no easy way out. A country has basically two options to improve its
competitiveness. The ￿rst, is ￿to achieve a sustained increase in productivity growth￿ 13;
unfortunately, this is di¢ cult to engineer, since it requires reforms in the goods and ￿nan-
cial markets and is unlikely to work overnight. The second is lower nominal wage growth,
which is equally di¢ cult, especially from a political point of view. In the absence of any
policy change, the most likely scenario is one of ￿competitive disin￿ ation: a period of sus-
tained high unemployment, leading to lower nominal wage growth until unit labor costs
have decreased, competitiveness have improved, the current account de￿cit has decreased,
and demand and output have recovered￿ 14. This is typically a long and painfull process,
and it does not come as a surprise the fact that some authors - and some politicians too
- have started discussing about the risk of a EMU break-up.
Several interesting questions arise. For instance: why in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials
are so persistent? Which is the role of price/wage rigidities, and which is the one of




5In this paper we build a currency union model that may help to explain and characterize
some of these facts, and to answer some of these questions. The attention is focused on the
importance of di⁄erent labor market structures and di⁄erent degrees of real wage rigidities
in explaining business cycle ￿ uctuations and di⁄erentials. In particular, by determining
the size of ￿ uctations as deviations from the e¢ cient level, we are able to focus on the
cyclical, ine¢ cient component of these di⁄erentials.
3 The Model
A currency union is a group of regions or countries sharing the same currency, with a
single central bank entitled to conduct the monetary policy. To keep things as simple as
possible, we consider a currency union that consists of two regions, Home and Foreign,
taken of the same size (normalised to 1). Each economy, which is populated by identical,
in￿nitively lived households, is specialised in the production of a bundle of di⁄erentiated
goods. There is no migration across regions. Capital markets are complete. Countries
are symmetric for everything apart from labor market institutions. The labor market is
characterised by hiring costs, leading to involuntary unemployment in equilibrium15.
3.1 Households
The representative household within a country is thought of as a continuum of members
with names on the unit interval. Each household purchases consumption goods, holds
money and supplies labor. Wages are ￿xed by bargaining, and, given the presence of
involuntary unemployment, the labor supply is not binding. Household members can be
employed or unemployed. To avoid distributional issues, we assume that households pool
their income and consumption.


























where variables with star are referred to the foreign country. Ni
t denotes the number of
employed individuals in the representative household of country i while Ct and C￿
t are the

















jt is the quantity of the good produced in country j and consumed by residents
of country i. ￿ 2 [0;1] is the weight on the imported goods in the utility of private
consumption; a value for ￿ strictly less than 1
2 re￿ ects the presence of home bias in
consumption.
15The basic framework of the currency union is inspired by the work of Benigno (2004) and Gal￿-Monacelli
(2006). The structure of the labor market builds on Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006) and Abbritti et al. (2006).
6The production sectors are characterised by monopolistic competition. The index of
country i￿ s consumption of the good produced in country j, Ci

















; i = H or F; j = H or F
The parameter ￿ (￿￿) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced
within Home (Foreign) country.
Utility maximization for the Home household is subject to a sequence of budget con-






PFt(j)CFt(j)dj + Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g ￿ Dt + WtNt ￿ Tt
for t = 0;1;2;:::; where Pit(j) is the price of good j produced in country i (expressed
in the units of the single currency). Dt is the nominal payo⁄ in period t of the portfolio
held at the end of period t ￿ 1; Wt is the nominal wage and Tt denotes lump-sum taxes.
We assume complete securities markets; Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one-
period ahead nominal payo⁄s, which is common across countries. Implicit in the budget
constraint is the assumption that the law of one price holds across the union.
















for i = H;F(￿);z 2 [0;1]. The appropriate domestic (producer) price indexes of the
























Since the law of one price holds, PHt represents both the price index for the bundle
of goods imported from country H as well as H￿ s domestic price index. From the de-
mand functions (3), we get (for the Home country):
1 Z
o




Furthermore, the optimal allocation of expenditures by country of origin implies, for
the Home country:
PHtCHt = (1 ￿ ￿)PtCt; PFtCFt = ￿PtCt (4)
16The utility maximization problem for the foreign household is completely analogous.





Ft = (1 ￿ ￿)P￿
t C￿
t (5)







1￿￿ are respectively the Home and
the Foreign CPI indexes. As usual with Cobb-Douglas preferences, households allocate a
￿xed proportion of income to each consumption bundle.
Under the assumption of ￿home bias￿in consumption (i.e. ￿ < 1
2) di⁄erent regions
consume goods in di⁄erent proportions; therefore, even if the Law of One Price holds
for all goods, the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) may not hold at the aggregate level
(Pt 6= P￿
t ).
Combining all previous results, we can write total consumption expenditures by Home￿ s
households as PHtCHt + PFtCFt = PtCt. Thus, conditional on optimal allocation of
expenditures, the period budget constraint is given by:
PtCt + Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g ￿ Dt + WtNt ￿ Tt (6)

























where Rt = 1
EtQt;t+1 is the (gross) nominal interest rate. The ￿rst condition is a
conventional Euler condition. The second, which is similar to a standard labor supply
equation, determines how many individuals within the representative household join the
labor force. The introduction of hiring costs implies that this condition is not binding in
equilibrium. In the following we assume that, in equilibrium, the wage is set at a level
that guarantees full participation (Ni
t = 1). The assumption of full participation allows
us to say that all unemployment is ￿involuntary￿ .
3.2 The Terms of Trade and the Real Exchange Rate
In this section we introduce some de￿nitions and identities that are used extensively below.
First, we de￿ne the bilateral term of trade between the Home and Foreign countries as





The terms of trade, which represent an index of competitiveness, plays a central role in
our model. Movements in the terms of trade are crucial for understanding the response of
the economy to asymmetric shocks and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
As the Law of One Price holds for all goods - which implies PFt = P￿
Ft and PHt = P￿
Ht
- the CPI and the domestic price indexes in the two regions are related according to:
Pt = PHt (St)
￿ ; P￿
t = PFt (St)
￿￿ (10)
8Let domestic (i.e. producer prices￿ ) in￿ ation be de￿ned as the rate of change of do-











logs of the above identities, we obtain a relation between Domestic and CPI in￿ ation:
￿t = ￿H
t + ￿￿st; ￿￿
t = ￿F
t ￿ ￿￿st (11)
for the Home and the Foreign country respectively17.
Finally, the real exchange rate Vt is de￿ned as the ratio between foreign and home







3.3 International Risk Sharing
Capital markets are complete: each household has access to a complete set of contin-
gent claims, traded internationally. Combining the ￿rst order conditions relative to state
contingent securities in the two countries, we obtain the usual result:


















u0(C0) is a constant, re￿ ecting initial conditions regarding
relative net asset positions. If PPP holds (and this will occur in this model for ￿ = 1=2),
the real exchange rate Vt = 1 and the marginal utilities of consumption are equated up to







Therefore, even with complete ￿nancial markets, it is not e¢ cient to equalize consump-
tion across countries when there is a Home Bias in consumption (￿ < 1
2).
Henceforth, to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume initial conditions are
such that   = 1.
3.4 Firms and the labor market
The setup of the supply side of the economy follows Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006).
The production in each country is composed by a continuum of ￿rms, indexed by j 2
[0;1]. Each ￿rm in a country produces a di⁄erentiated good with an identical technology:
Y i
t (j) = Ai
tNi
t(j); for i = H;F(￿) (15)
where the variables Ai
t represent the state of technology in country i.
17Notice that the distinction between CPI in￿ ation and domestic in￿ ation, while important at the country
level, vanishes for the monetary union as a whole. In fact, summing up the equation for the logs in prices,





9In each period a fraction ￿i of the employed loses their jobs and joins the unemployment
pool. Employment in ￿rm j evolves according to:
Ni
t(j) = (1 ￿ ￿i)Ni
t￿1(j) + Hi
t(j); for i = H;F(￿) (16)
where Hi
t(j) is the the number of new hires for ￿rm j in country i: We assume that
the job destruction rate ￿i is exogenously given18.
We denote by Ui
t the number of searching workers who are available for hire in country
i. Since we make assumptions below that guarantee full participation, Ui
t is de￿ned as19
Ui
t = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)Ni
t￿1; for i = H;F(￿) (17)
￿After hiring￿unemployment, instead, is de￿ned as the fraction of the population who
are left without a job after hiring takes place, ui






t(j)dj evolves according to
Hi
t = Ni






t(j)dj denotes aggregate employment20.
Firms face a cost of searching and recruiting new workers ￿￿ la Howitt￿ 21. Hiring costs
for ￿rm j in country i are:
Gi
tHi
t(j); for i = H;F(￿) (21)
where Gi
t is the cost per hire in country i (expressed in terms of the domestic CES bundle











; for i = H;F(￿) (22)
where ’ > 0 and Bi is a positive scaling parameter that may be in￿ uenced by the
authorities. The marginal cost of hiring is increasing in the aggregate hiring rate Hi
t:
this captures the idea that a high rate of hiring may force ￿rms to increase their search
18There is some empirical evidence showing that the job destruction rate remains rather constant over
time. See Christo⁄el and Linzert (2005), p. 12.
19We assume that the wage is set at a level such that at all times all individuals are either employed or
willing to work. Notice that the labor force is normalized to unity.












. The amount of labor












Yt dj. It can be shown that equilibrium variations in zt = logZt around the perfect
foresight steady state are of second order. Thus, up to a ￿rst order approximation,
yt = at + nt (20)
21Cfr. Howitt (1988).
10intensity. The marginal cost is decreasing in Ui
t: a high aggregate unemployment makes
it easier and cheaper for ￿rms to ￿nd willing and competent workers. Notice that there
are two externalities at work in the model. When a ￿rm hires new workers, she does not




In this framework, the presence of hiring costs creates a friction in the labor market
similar to that of standard, but much more complex, search models.







; for i = H;F(￿) (23)
i.e. as the ratio of aggregate hires to the employment rate, we can rewrite the cost per
hire for H and F as






Recruitment costs are increasing in the labor market tightness index. Since by as-
sumption ￿rms can hire workers only from the pool of unemployed, xt 2 [0;1].
Note that, from the viewpoint of the unemployed, xt can be interpreted as the proba-
bility of ￿nding a new job in period t, i.e. as the job-￿nding rate.
3.5 Market Clearing Conditions



































obtain the aggregate goods market clearing condition for Home:
Yt = Ct(St)￿ + GtHt (26)











t (St)￿￿ + G￿
tH￿
t = Ct(St)￿(1￿￿) + G￿
tH￿
t (28)
11The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences over the Home and Foreign goods allows











Equation (29) simply states the relative price of domestic (foreign) goods is inversely
related to the quantity produced in the two regions (net of aggregate hiring costs)23.
This expression allows us to highlight one simple, but interesting, point. First, note
that in this model in￿ ation di⁄erentials are simply represented by variations in the terms
of trade, i.e. ￿st = ￿F
t ￿ ￿H
t . Suppose that in a long run equilibrium the Home and the
Foreign country are characterised by di⁄erent productivity growth rate, which we call ￿a
and ￿￿
a. Assume employment is constant in the long run equilibrium; it is easy to check
that in￿ ation di⁄erentials evolves according to:
￿st = ￿F
t ￿ ￿H
t = ￿a ￿ ￿￿
a
This shows one possible explanation for the persistent in￿ ation di⁄erentials we see in
the European Union: persistent di⁄erences in the productivity growth rates24. In￿ ation
di⁄erentials, in this case, are an equilibrium phenomenon, performing a positive role:
they allow the clearings of all markets. In other words, in￿ ation di⁄erentials are not
undesirable per se. As Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry puts it, ￿whether the observed di⁄erences
are desirable or undesirable, depends in large part on the nature of shocks that are causing
that divergences￿ 25.
In this paper, by determining in￿ ation and output ￿ uctuations in terms of deviations
from the corresponding e¢ cient levels, we are able to focus on the cyclical, undesired,
components of in￿ ation and output di⁄erentials. To this purpose, we need to analyse
three di⁄erent equilibrium allocations: the constrained e¢ cient, the ￿ exible prices and the
sticky prices allocations. This is the task to which we turn.
4 The Social Planner ￿ s Problem
In our framework there are three sources of ine¢ ciency; two of them are standard in the
New Keynesian literature, and serve to give a role to monetary policy. The ￿rst consists
22The Cobb-Douglas assumption in fact imply that the percentage variation in relative prices is equal,
and opposite in sign, to the percentage variation in relative quantities.










24This mechanism di⁄ers from the famous Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect for two main reasons: (i) in the
standard Balassa-Samuelson, each country produces two goods, one tradable and one nontradable; (ii) in
our case PPP does not hold.
25See Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry (2006), p. 3. These authors compare the cases of Ireland, where the real
exchange rate appreciation can be explained by ￿advances in productivity and movements up the value
chain in the traded goods sector￿ , with the cases of Portugal and Italy, where competitiveness loss has
contributed to poor economic performances.
12in market structures characterized by monopolistic competition. The second comes from
the assumption of price rigidities. The third source of ine¢ ciency, which is speci￿c to this
model, is the presence of frictional costs for hiring new workers.
In this section we derive the so-called ￿constrained e¢ cient allocation￿ . Following
Blanchard and Gali￿(2006), we assume that the social planner maximizes the welfare of
the Union, taking as given the technological constraints and the labor market frictions
that are present in the decentralised economy. In other words, the social planner cannot
eliminate or reduce hiring costs, which are simply taken as a fact of life; he can, however,
internalize the e⁄ects of variations in employment on labor market tightness and, hence,
on hiring costs26.
Given simmetry in preferences and technology, the social planner chooses an equi-
librium in which the goods, in each countries, are produced and consumed in identical
quantities Ci
jt(z) = Ci
jt. Moreover, since participation in the labor market has no individ-
ual costs but some social bene￿ts (it lowers hiring costs), the social planner chooses an
allocation with full participation.
Hence, the Union￿ s optimal allocation can be described as the solution of the following




















Ht ￿CHt + C￿
Ht = AtNt ￿ GtHt
CW










t are as de￿ned before. Notice that the previous constraints
already embed the optimal condition whereby the di⁄erent good types in any given country
should be produced and consumed in identical quantities.


























where ￿t is the shadow value of an additional unit of the good produced at Home and
￿t is the shadow value of an additional unit of the foreign good. As usual, the optimal
allocation of consumption implies that the marginal rate of substitution between the two
goods is equal across agents. Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that the ratio
of domestic goods over imported goods consumption is constant and equal to 1￿￿
￿ .
Much more interesting is the optimality condition with respect to employment. For
ease of exposition we will focus on the Home country. Solving the social planner￿ s problem
26Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006), p.9



























which must hold with strict equality if Nt < 1. The above condition states that the
marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption (the left hand side) has to
be less or equal to the corresponding marginal rate of transformation (the right hand side)
- both normalised by productivity. Hiring an additional worker at time t has three e⁄ects.
First, it generates additional output. Second, it increases the recruitment costs at time t.
This e⁄ect is represented by the term ￿B(1 + ’)x
’
t . Third, it reduces the costs of hiring
new workers in period t+1. This e⁄ect is captured by the last term at the right hand side.
The important point to note is that the above expression implies a constant level of
employment. Note in fact that, world consumption of the home good is proportional to
productivity
CW
Ht ￿ CHt + C￿
Ht = At(Nt ￿ Bx
’
t Ht) (31)
It follows that the optimality condition does not depend on the productivity levels
prevailing at Home (or Foreign). This invariance is the result of two main assumption:
1. The utility function is log in consumption: this implies that income and substitution
e⁄ects o⁄set each other on the labor supply.
2. Unit hiring costs varies one-for-one with productivity shocks.
The fact that employment is constant is a very useful result, since it allows us to say
that any ￿ uctuation in employment is ine¢ cient27.
To determine the e¢ cient level of employment we can proceed in two steps. First, the





￿H + (1 ￿ ￿H)x
￿1+￿
(1 ￿ ￿HB (x)
’)￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿H))(1 + ’)B (x)
’ (32)
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿H)’Bx1+’
Second, the optimal level of employment at Home is given by
NE =
xE
￿H + (1 ￿ ￿H)xE
(33)
The optimal employment level depends therefore on the separation rate ￿H, on the hir-
ing costs￿scaling parameter B, on the sensitivity of hiring costs to labor market conditions
’ and on parameters in￿ uencing the disutility of working (￿ and ￿0).
A constant employment level implies that output is proportional to Home productivity




￿ NE(1 ￿ ￿HB (xE)
’).
Similar conditions and the same conclusions hold for the Foreign country28.
27Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006, p. 9-11) get the same result in the context of a one-country model.
28The appendix contains the key expressions for the foreign country.
145 Equilibrium under Flexible Prices
In this section we derive the equilibrium under the assumption that prices are ￿ exible.
We ￿rst describe the optimal price setting of a ￿rm, given the wage. We then characterize
the equilibrium that emerges with Nash bargained wages. Finally, we introduce real wage
rigidities in form of a Hall (2005) type wage norm.
We focus on the Home country; the solution for the Foreign country is completely
symmetric.
5.1 Optimal Price Setting
Suppose that all ￿rms adjust prices optimally each period to maximize the present dis-




Qt;t+s fPHt+s(i)Yt+s(i) ￿ PHt+sGt+sHt+s(i) ￿ Wt+sNt+s(i)g (35)






function and the employment evolution equation. Qt;t+s = ￿s Ct
Ct+s
Pt
Pt+s is the relevant
stochastic discount factor for nominal payo⁄s. Notice that the unit recruitment costs are
expressed in units of domestic goods.
The optimal price setting rule takes the form of a markup ￿ = ￿







MCt = ￿MCt (36)






￿ + B (xt)














Pt is the real wage expressed in terms of the consumption good.
The key di⁄erence between the supply side in our model and in a standard New Key-
nesian model with a neoclassical labor market is the behaviour of the real marginal cost29.
In a model with a competitive labor market the real marginal cost is strictly related to







As for Home, it can be shown that the optimal level of employment does not depend on productivity,












E is the e¢ cient level for the tightness indicator for the foreign country, implicitely given as the
solution to the optimality condition for N
￿
t .




















29Krause and Lubik (2005) make a similar argument comparing a standard NK model with a model with
search and matching frictions in the labor market. See p.10-11.
15In our model, which embeds the NK model as a special case, the presence of hiring costs
creates a wedge between the real wage and the marginal costs relevant for the ￿rm, which
in turn are essential to explain in￿ ation dynamics. This wedge consist of two terms. The
￿rst, B (xt)
’, represents the additional cost the ￿rm faces to hire a new worker; the second
- the last term in (37) - re￿ ects the savings in future hiring costs resulting from increasing
the number of employees today. The cyclical behaviour of marginal costs in a model with
labor market frictions can thus depart substantially from that of real wages. As Krause
and Lubik (2005) notice, ￿Hiring frictions generate a surplus for existing matches which
give rise to long-term employment relationships. These, in turn, reduce the allocative role
of current real wages. As a consequence, the e⁄ective real marginal cost can change even
if the wage does not change￿ 30.






for all t. When shocks occur, each ￿rm varies its prices and hiring decisions to keep the





















Similar conditions hold for the foreign country (See Appendix).
To get a full characterization of the equilibrium, we now need to specify a mechanism
of wage determination.
5.2 Equilibrium with Nash Bargained Wages
In this model, the presence of hiring costs creates a positive rent for existing employment
relationships. Following much of the literature, we assume wages are bargained to split this
rent between the ￿rm and the employee, according to their respective bargaining power.
Consider the generic ￿rm j in the Home country.
The value of a job for ￿rm j ￿is simply given by the hiring costs Gt, as a ￿rm can
always replace a worker at that cost￿ 32. Notice however that hiring costs are expressed in
terms of the domestic goods, while wages are set in terms of the consumption goods. The




Turning to the problem of the worker, let WE
t and WU
t denote the value of being
employed or unemployed, expressed in consumption units.
30Krause and Lubik (2005), p. 11.
31Note that real wages for Home (and the same is true for Foreign) are determined in terms of the
corresponding consumption good - i.e. are the ratio of the nominal wage rate and the corresponding CPI
index. Unit recruitment costs, instead, are de￿ned in terms of the home good for Home (i.e. using as
de￿ ator PHt) and in terms of the foreign good for Foreign (i.e. divided for PFt).
32Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006), p. 14. This section follows closely their paper.
16The marginal value of an employment relationship is given by:
WE
t =WR







(1 ￿ ￿H(1 ￿ xt+1))WE




The ￿rst term represents the worker￿ s wage income; the second the disutility of work
and the last the discounted expected continuation value. ￿H(1 ￿ xt+1) is the probability
of being unemployed at time t conditional on being employed at time t.


















t ￿ ￿0Ct (Nt)




















where we make use of the fact that PHt
Pt = (St)￿￿ and we de￿ne ￿ =
￿
1￿￿ as the relative
weight of workers in the Nash bargaining, which re￿ ects workers￿bargaining power.




















[(1 ￿ xt+1)(￿B (xt+1)
’)]
)
where we use the fact that Ct(St)￿ = CHt + C￿
Ht = CW
Ht:



















[(1 + ￿(1 ￿ xt+1))B (xt+1)
’]
)
This condition determines the evolution of (un)employment under Nash bargaining.
17It is easy to verify that the decentralised equilibrium with Nash bargained wages
involves a constant job-￿nding rate and, hence, a constant level of unemployment33.
Again, this crucial result derives from two assumptions: a utility function that is log
in consumption and recruitment costs that vary one for one with producivity shocks.
Combining the equilibrium under Nash bargaining and the Nash wage rule, we can







￿ [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]B (xM)
’ (48)
where xM is the (constant) equilibrium job-￿nding rate, which is solution of (47).
The equilibrium wage moves one for one with At(St)￿￿. Notice that, since the employ-
ment level is constant at Home and abroad, the terms of trade St varies proportionally to
At
A￿
t . Changes in productivity at Home or at Foreign are neutralized by changes in the wage
rate and thus do not a⁄ect ￿rms￿incentives to hire people; as a result, unemployment is
unchanged. In other words, movements in the term of trade, re￿ ected in movements in
the real wage, imply that employment does not vary with productivity shocks.
Compare the equilibrium under the e¢ cient allocation (30) and under the decentralised
equilibrium (47). While the (un)employment level is constant in both cases, these levels
generally di⁄ers. Mainly due to the monopolistic distortions, the unemployment level
under the e¢ cient allocation is higher than the one prevailing in the decentralised solution.
It is easy to verify that the conditions under which the two equilibria correspond, are the
following34:
1. Perfect competition in the goods market, i.e. ￿ = 1 (or ￿alternatively a production
subsidy which exactly o⁄set the market power distortions￿ 35).
2. ’ = ￿, i.e. the share of the surplus that goes to workers has to coincide with the
elasticity of hiring costs with respect to the job-￿nding rate.
Similar conditions and exactly the same conclusions hold for the Foreign country (See
Appendix).









>￿1(1 ￿ ￿FB￿) (50)
These conditions require that the real wage in each country remains above the corre-
sponding marginal rate of substitution, when the latter is evaluated at full employment.
They guarantee ￿full participation (as all the employed would rather work than not) and
that those without a job in any given period are involuntary unemployed￿ 36.
33To see this, notice that C
W
Ht = CHt + C
￿
Ht = At(Nt ￿ Bx
’
t Ht). It follows that
CW
Ht
At does not depend
on At.
34Blanchard-Gali (2006) obtain the same conditions in the context of a one country model.
35Blanchard-Gali (2006), p. 16.
36See Blanchard-Gali￿(2006), p. 17. These assumptions are needed in order to de￿ne the (before hiring)
185.3 Introducing Real Wage Rigidities
As Christo⁄el and Linzert note, especially in Europe, ￿sudden and signi￿cant shifts in
the aggregate wage level are not observed. Due to collective wage bargaining agreements,
wage changes only take place on a quite infrequent basis. Therefore, a wage that can be
freely adjusted each period assumes a degree of wage ￿ exibility that is hardly consistent
with actual practises￿ .37
Hall (2005) shows that the introduction of sticky wages improves the behaviour of
labor market models, as it increases the sensitivity of labor-market conditions - and hence
unemployment - to productivity shocks. Blanchard and Gali (2005) demonstrate that the
introduction of real wage rigidities is a natural way to overcome one of the shortcomings
of the standard New Keynesian model, namely the lack of a meaningful trade-o⁄ between
output stabilization and in￿ ation stabilization.
Accordingly, and following much of the recent literature, we introduce real wage rigidity
by employing a version of Hall￿ s (2005) notion of wage norm. A wage norm may arise as
a result of social conventions that constrain wage adjustment for existing and newly hired
workers. One way to model this is to assume that the real wage is a weighted average of
the Nash bargained wage Wn
t and a wage norm ￿ W, which it is simply assumed to be the
wage prevailing in steady state.










1￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ W￿￿￿￿
e"￿w
t (53)
For Home and Foreign respectively. The wage norm ￿ W ( ￿ W￿ for Foreign) is simply
the wage prevailing in steady state while ￿ (￿￿) is an index of the real wage rigidities
present in the economy, with 0 ￿ ￿i ￿ 1. Notice that we introduce an exogenous shock to
the wage determination process, e"w
t (e"￿w
t ). This ￿wage shock￿ , which has the nature of a
standard cost-push shock, can be interpreted as an unexpected deviation from the wage
rule determined by some - not speci￿ed - political reason.
The introduction of such a wage rule modi￿es the decentralised equilibrium solution.
Consider for instance the Home country. In equilibrium:
(Wn
t )





















As shown before, the Nash bargained wage varies proportionally to At(St)￿￿ and thus
neutralizes the e⁄ect of productivity changes on employment. When real wage rigidities
are present, instead, the wages do not move enough to absorb the impact of technology




t = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿i)N
i
t￿1; for i = H;F(
￿) (51)
37Christo⁄el and Linzert (2005), p. 17-18.
19be constant. As in Blanchard-Gal￿ (2005), the presence of real wage rigidities introduces
a substantial di⁄erence between the e¢ cient solution (where employment is constant)
and the decentralised solution (where employment varies with productivity shocks). For
this reason, to the extent that ￿ or ￿￿ are di⁄erent from zero, it is not possible for the
monetary authority to stabilize simultaneously in￿ ation and unemployment. There is no
￿Divine Coincidence￿ .
6 Introducing Sticky Prices
We introduce nominal price rigidity using a model ￿ la Calvo (1983). Each period, a ￿rm
faces a ￿xed probability (1￿￿) of adjusting its price, irrespective of the time elapsed since
it last reset its price. The ￿rm resets the price in order to maximize its present discounted
value, while taking into consideration that the price it chooses will remain e⁄ective for a
(random) number of periods. It can be shown that the optimal price setting rule for a













where ~ PHt denotes the price newly set at time t, Yt+s=t is the level of output in period
t+s for a ￿rm resetting its price in period t and ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 is the gross desired markup. The
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As Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006) note, the two previous equations embody the essence of
the integration of hiring costs in a standard NK model. In fact:
1. Taking as given the path of marginal costs, the optimal price setting rule takes the
same form as in the standard Calvo model.
2. The dynamics of the marginal costs are however deeply in￿ uenced by the introduc-
tion of hiring costs and real wage rigidities (which enters through WR
t = (Wn
t )
1￿￿ ￿ ￿ W
￿￿ e"w
t ).
Log-linearizing around a zero in￿ ation steady state the optimal price setting rule and
the price index equation PHt =
h
(1 ￿ ￿)( ~ PHt)1￿￿ + ￿(PHt￿1)1￿￿
i 1








+ ￿c mct (57)
where ^ ￿H
t is domestic (i.e. producer prices￿ ) in￿ ation, c mct represent the log deviation
of real marginal cost from its steady state value and ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)=￿. Note that,
while (57) looks like a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, the dynamics of the real
marginal costs are now substantially di⁄erent from the ones of a standard NK model. We
defer a full discussion of this important point to later.
38See Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006) for a detailed description of the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve with Hiring Costs.







































In order to close the model, a characterization of monetary policy is needed.
We assume the Central Bank sets the short term nominal interest rate by reacting
to the average in￿ ation and output gap levels in the currency area. Consistently with
empirical evidence, we also assume that monetary policy displays a certain degree ￿m of
interest rate smoothing39. Speci￿cally, the monetary authority follows the Taylor-type
rule:





















Log-linearizing (60) around the steady state, we get:
^ {t = ￿m^ {t￿1 + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿m)Et^ ￿U




t is an i.i.d monetary policy shock.
6.2 Log-linearized Marginal Costs
The model is not solvable in a closed form solution. To proceed, we need an approximation
around the steady state. In this section we show how to approximate marginal cost
dynamics. The log-linearization of the other equations characterizing the economies does
not pose particular problems.
Consider the Home country. Log-linearization of the marginal cost around the steady
state gives40:
c mct =￿WR (S)
￿ ￿
^ wt ￿ ^ at + ￿^ sH
t
￿




Ht ￿ ^ at) ￿
￿
^ cw




Variables with ￿hat￿denote log-deviations from steady state; WR and g = B(x)’ are
the steady state values for real wages and unit recruitment costs, and ￿ is the markup.
Note that we have normalized the steady state value of productivity to unity (A = 1):
39See, e.g, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999).






+ g(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿H)) =
1
￿
21The loglinear approximations for the labor market tightness xt = Ht
Ut and for the world
consumption of the home good CW
Ht = At(Nt ￿ Bx
’
t Ht) are given by:
￿H^ xt = ^ nt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿H)(1 ￿ x)^ nt￿1 (64)
^ cw










Following Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006), we introduce two approximations that considerably
simplify the characterization of the equilibrium:
1. Hiring costs are small relative to output, so that we can approximate ^ cw
Ht with
^ cw
Ht = ^ at + ^ nt. More precisely, we assume that ￿ and g are of the same order of magnitude
as ^ nt, implying that terms involving g^ nt or ￿^ nt are of second order.
2. Fluctuations in ^ xt are large relative to those in ^ nt, an approximation that follows
from the log-linearization of the labor tightness index (64) and the assumption of a low
separation rate. This implies that terms involving g^ xt or ￿^ xt cannot be ignored.
We can therefore rewrite the expression for marginal cost as:
c mct = ￿WR (S)
￿ ￿
^ wt ￿ ^ at + ￿^ sH
t
￿
+ ’g￿f^ xt ￿ ￿Et^ xt+1g (66)
To fully determine the marginal costs, we need a characterisation of the processes for
the real wages. Log-linearization of the Home wage rule, WR
t = (Wn
t )
1￿￿ ￿ ￿ W
￿￿ e"w
t , gives




t comes from the log-linearization of the Nash wage schedule and can be







1+￿ (1 + ￿) ^ nt








￿^ at + ￿^ sH
t
Using these results, we ￿nally obtain the dynamics of the real marginal costs for the
Home country:
c mct =￿2￿^ nt + g￿￿0^ xt ￿ g￿￿1Et f^ xt+1g (69)
￿￿￿WR (S)




Where the structural parameters ￿0, ￿1, and ￿2 depend on the bargaining power of
workers, on labor market conditions and on the degree of real wage stickyness41. The




Equation (69) highlights the determinants of marginal costs. Marginal costs increase
with employment (^ nt) as the ￿rm has to pay higher wages to persuade households to
41It can be shown that ￿0 = ’(1 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)), ￿1 = ￿
h






, and ￿2 =
￿0 (N)
1+￿ (1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿).
22provide more labor. This is the only channel at work in the standard NK model. Marginal
costs increases with the worsening of labor market conditions at time t (i.e. with an
increase of ^ xt); an expected increase of Et^ xt+1, instead, has the opposite e⁄ect, as it
becomes convenient for the ￿rm to hire at time t in order to be ready for a more di¢ cult
labor market in time t + 1. Finally, marginal costs depend negatively on productivity
shocks (^ at) and positively on wage shocks ("w
t ) and on the terms of trade (^ st).
In order to express marginal costs in terms of unemployment, let ^ ut = ut ￿ u denote
the deviations of (after-hiring) unemploment from its steady state value u: Taking a ￿rst
order Taylor expansion of ui
t = 1 ￿ Ni







Using this approximation and (64), we can rewrite the evolution of marginal costs as
a function of unemployment and shocks:
c mct =￿￿0^ ut + ￿1^ ut￿1 + ￿2Et^ ut+1 (70)
￿￿￿3^ at + ￿￿￿3^ st + ￿3"w
t
where the coe¢ cients ￿i depends on the structural parameter of the model. Similarly













3^ st + ￿￿
3"w
t
We are now ready to characterize - in terms of loglinear approximations - the con-
strained e¢ cient, the natural and the sticky prices outcomes.
7 Equilibrium Fluctuations
7.1 Constrained E¢ cient Allocation
The e¢ cient constrained allocation is characterized by the following relationships (in log-
linear form):
￿ ut = ￿ u￿
t = 0
￿ yU




(^ at + ^ a￿
t) = ^ aU
t
￿ yt ￿ ￿ y￿
t =^ at ￿ ^ a￿
t
￿ ct ￿ ￿ c￿
t =(1 ￿ 2￿)(^ at ￿ ^ a￿
t)
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￿)￿1 (N
￿)
1+￿ (1 + ￿).
24Where variables with bars denote the constrained e¢ cient outcome and a union-wide






As shown before, in the e¢ cient equilibrium (un)employment is invariant to shocks and
thus constant across time. Union-wide output and consumption depend only on the union￿ s
supply shocks. Asymmetric shocks in￿ uence the relative output of Home and Foreign.
Finally notice that as long as there is home bias in consumption (i.e. ￿ < 1
2) the PPP
does not hold and consumption is not equated in equilibrium.
7.2 The Flexible Price Equilibrium
Given a variable X, we denote with ~ X the deviation of a variable from its constrained
e¢ cient level, i.e. ~ X = ^ X ￿ ￿ X. With ￿ exible prices, monetary policy is neutral and real
variables are a⁄ected only by real disturbances. We can characterize the ￿ exible price





￿1~ ut￿1 + ￿2Et~ ut+1
















3~ st ￿ ￿￿￿￿
3 [(1 ￿ ￿)^ a￿





t = ~ cU
t = ~ nU
t = ￿~ uA
t
~ yt =￿~ ut; ~ y￿
t = ￿~ u￿
t
~ st = ~ yt ￿ ~ y￿
t
~ ct = ~ c￿
t + (1 ￿ 2￿)~ st
where, to simplify the notation, we de￿ne aggregate unemployment as a weighted












The crucial conditions are the ￿rst two, which describe the evolution of unemploy-
ment gap. Note that, since employment is constant under the e¢ cient allocation, any
(un)employment ￿ uctuation is ine¢ cient. It is useful to highlight some facts. First, unem-
ployment displays a substantial degree of inertia. In fact, on the one side, the expectations
about future labor market conditions a⁄ect today￿ s ￿rms￿decisions; on the other side, to-
day￿ s hiring costs depend on the employment level at time t ￿ 1, which is inherited from
the past. Second, if real wages are sticky (i.e. ￿ or ￿￿ are di⁄erent from zero), productivity
shocks at Home or Foreign, as well as deviations of the terms of trade from its e¢ cient
level, in￿ uence the unemployment gap, i.e. a⁄ect the wedge between the ￿e¢ cient￿and the
￿natural￿unemployment level. Third, even when real wage rigidities are absent, shocks to
the wage determination mechanism - which have the nature of ￿cost-push shocks￿- create
ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations of the unemployment gap.
Blanchard and Gal￿ (2005) show that one of the shortcomings of the standard NK
models, namely the lack of a meaningful policy trade o⁄ between output and in￿ ation
stabilization (which they call ￿Divine Coincidence￿ ), comes from the fact that the gap
between the e¢ cient and the natural levels of output is constant and invariant to shocks.
In this model, the introduction of real wage rigidities and of exogenous wage shocks de-
couples the evolution of unemployment under the two regimes. Unemployment would be
25characterized by ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations even if prices were ￿exible. In terms of monetary
policy, and contrary to what happens in standard NK models, stabilizing in￿ ation does
not stabilize output. A pure in￿ ation targeting strategy is not optimal anymore.
Under ￿ exible prices, the terms of trade, which are a⁄ected only by relative distur-
bances, exert their crucial role of balancing the burden of production across regions. A
larger supply shock in the Home region depreciates the terms of trade and shifts, optimally,
a part of the production burden from country F to country H.
Finally notice that the implied path of the nominal interest rate, in an equilibrium in
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7.3 Sticky Prices
If prices are sticky, monetary policy matters. In a closed economy model, the presence of
staggered price setting typically leads to an ine¢ cient dispersion of in￿ ation and output
across resources produced using the same technology. In an open economy model, price
stickyness creates an additional source of distortion: as prices are not free to adjust, the
terms of trade typically follow an ine¢ cient path in response to asymmetric disturbances43.
In this model, two new elements deeply a⁄ect the economy: the presence of labor market
imperfections and real wage rigidities. In the following we show that these elements
matter substantially for the dynamic behaviour of the economy and, in particular, for the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
It can be shown that the union-wide IS equation takes the form:
~ uA
t = Et~ uA
t+1 + (rt ￿ Et~ ￿U
t+1 ￿ Et￿^ aU
t+1) (72)
where ~ ￿U
t and ~ uA




t+1). The IS equation - in terms of union-wide variables - takes the
same form as in a standard closed economy model. Solving (72) forward, we get
~ cU











Hence, the unemployment and consumption gaps are driven by the expected future
path of real interest rates and productivity di⁄erentials (the latter mimic the natural in-
terest rate that would prevail under the constrained e¢ cient allocation). While the real
interest rate a⁄ects aggregate (union) unemployment, terms of trade movements distrib-
ute production among the two countries and explain unemployment and consumption
43In an open economy model, this problem has typically a (at least partial) solution: the exchange rate.
Movements in the exchange rate in fact may provide some additional ￿ exibility to the terms of trade. This
instrument, however, is absent in a monetary union. See, for instance, Benigno (2004) and Pappa (2002)
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Note that the coe¢ cients are functions of the structural parameters characterizing the
two economies: workers￿bargaining power, hiring costs, separation rates, markups, degree
of nominal stickiness or of real wage rigidity, and so on. The introduction of hiring costs
and real wage rigidities substantially change the dynamics of the marginal costs, which in
turn in￿ uence the ￿rms￿optimal price setting and the in￿ ation dynamics.
In open economy models, an implicit inertia in the in￿ ation rate is inherent. In fact,
from the de￿nition of the terms of trade St = PFt
PHt we get the following relationship between
the terms of trade and the domestic in￿ ation rates:
~ st ￿ ~ st￿1 = ~ ￿F
t ￿ ~ ￿H
t (76)
As Benigno (2004) notes, ￿If monetary policy is not able to eliminate the link between
the in￿ ation rate and the terms of trade, in￿ ation itself will be a function of its past
values￿ .44
Equations (72), (73), (74), (75), (76), together with the interest rate rule
^ {t = ￿m^ {t￿1 + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿m)Et~ ￿U
t+1 ￿ ￿x (1 ￿ ￿m) ~ uA
t + "m
t
completely characterize our equilibrium dynamics.
7.4 A Special Case: Complete Symmetry
In this section, we characterize the dynamics of a currency union composed by two coun-
tries that are perfectly symmetric. This is not a realistic scenario, but it allows us to
highlight some interesting facts of the model and it can constitute a good benchmark for
comparing more general frameworks.
44See Benigno (2004), p. 11.
27The ￿complete symmetry￿ assumption implies that the two regions have the same
parameter values:
￿￿
i = ￿i, ￿￿ = ￿ and ￿ = ￿￿
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where union wide variables are de￿ned as before and we use the fact that, under com-
plete symmetry, ~ uU
t = ~ uA
t . Equation (77) has the same interpretation as a closed-economy
AS equation, in which all variables are substituted with their union correspondents. This
is the equation the common central bank takes into consideration when it implements
monetary policy. What it is important to note is that in our model - even in the case of
complete symmetry - stabilizing in￿ ation does not stabilize the output gap. To see this,
consider ￿rst a ￿Pure In￿ ation Targeting￿strategy, i.e. a strategy aimed at stabilizing
in￿ ation at all horizons (^ ￿U
t = 0 at all t). It is well known that, under this strategy, ￿rms
have no incentive to change their prices45. Accordingly, the dynamics of the unemploy-
ment replicate exactly the dynamics under ￿ exible prices. From (77) it follows that the
unemployment gap evolves according to:
￿0~ uU
t = ￿1~ uU
t￿1 + ￿2Et~ uU
t+1 ￿ ￿￿3^ aU
t + ￿3"wU
t (78)
Thus, we see that a pure in￿ ation targeting strategy is unable to stabilize the unem-
ployment gap in the presence of wage and of productivity shocks (to the extent that real
wage rigidities are present). Moreover, the unemployment deviations from the e¢ cient
level are large and display a high degree of inertia. As in Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006), the
extent of real wage rigidities ￿ tends to increase the size of unemployment ￿ uctuations,
while labor market imperfections increase the persistency of these ￿ uctuations.
Secondly, consider a ￿Pure Unemployment Targeting￿policy, a strategy aimed at sta-
bilizing the unemployment gap in each period, i.e. ~ uU
t = 0 at all t.
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￿
A ￿Pure Unemployment Targeting￿strategy is thus unable to stabilize in￿ ation in face
of productivity or wage shocks.
Therefore, adverse realizations of wage or productivity shocks necessarily lead to a rise
in in￿ ation and/or a negative unemployment gap. The presence of real wage rigidities
and of wage shocks, by a⁄ecting the distance between the ￿rst best and the natural level
45See Gal￿ (2002) for a discussion of this point.
28of output, creates a non trivial trade-o⁄ between output and in￿ ation stabilization: the
￿divine coincidence￿ does not hold. A strategy that is exclusively focused on in￿ ation
stabilization it is not optimal anymore, as it leads to large and persistent unemployment
￿ uctuations.
In the ￿complete symmetry￿special case it is also possible to ￿nd a simple expression
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where ~ ￿R
t = ~ ￿H
t ￿ ~ ￿F
t and ~ uR
t = (~ ut ￿ ~ u￿
t) denote respectively in￿ ation and unemploy-
ment di⁄erentials.
Intuitively, the presence of labor market imperfections amplify the persistence of in-
￿ ation di⁄erentials following asymmetric shocks, while the degree of real wage rigidity ￿
mainly in￿ uences the size of these di⁄erentials. In particular, as long as ￿ > 0, a positive
productivity shock in the Home country generates a competiveness gain for Home (~ ￿R
t
decreases). An unexpected wage increase at Home ("w
t rises) translates instead into a pos-
itive in￿ ation di⁄erential. Finally, notice that shocks also have an indirect impact through
the terms of trade ~ st. Thus, a productivity shock ^ at not only in￿ uences (79) directly, it
also generates a terms of trade depreciation, partially o⁄setting the direct impact of the
shock. The strength of the impact of terms of trade shocks depends on the degree of trade
between the two countries, as represented by the home bias parameter ￿.
8 Baseline Calibration
In our baseline calibration, we assume that Home and Foreign are perfectly symmetric.
In this highly special case, Home and Foreign share the same structural parameters and
the results of the previous section apply. In the following, we will then relax the ￿perfect
symmetry￿assumption and analyse what happens when the two countries have di⁄erent
productive structures.
The parameters of the baseline calibration are chosen to be largely consistent with
those standard in the New Keynesian literature. The following table summarises the
values for the key parameters of our model (for i = H or F):
Preferences ￿ ￿i ￿i ￿i ￿
0:99 0:2 6 1:2 0:2
Technology Ai ’i
1 1
Labour market ui xi ￿i ￿i Bi
0:08 0:45 0:07 1 0:47
Price and Real Wage rigidities ￿i ￿i
0:75 0:5
Interest Rate rule ￿m ￿￿ ￿x
0:9 1:5 0





0:9 0:9 0 0:01 0:01 0:002
29Preferences: Time is taken as quarters. The discount factor ￿ is set equal to 0:99,
which implies a riskless annual return of about 4 percent. We assume the labor supply
elasticity to be ￿i = 0:2, which implies that disutilty of labor is almost linear. We see
this as a reasonable assumption, given that in our model labor changes on the extensive
margin and not on the intensive one. The elasticity of substitution between di⁄erentiated
goods ￿i is set equal to 6, corresponding to a markup ￿i = 1:2. Finally, the home bias
parameter ￿, representing the share of imported goods on total consumption, is set to 0:2.
Technology: Following Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006) we set the parameter ’i in the hiring
cost function, representing the sensitivity of hiring costs to labor market conditions, to be
’i = 146. The steady state level of productivity Ai is also set to 1.
The labor market: In the baseline calibration, we set unemployment in country i to
be ui = 0:08, which is roughly consistent with the average unemployment in Europe. The
job-￿nding rate xi is set to 0:45, which corresponds approximately to a monthly rate of





. We obtain a value ￿i = 0:07. The relative bargaining power
￿i is set to 1, which implies that ￿rms and workers have the same bargaining power. The
scaling parameter Bi is chosen such that hiring costs represent a 1:5 percent fraction of
steady state output47. The parameters ￿i can then be determined using steady state
identities.
The degree of Price rigidity ￿i is set equal to 0:75, as in Gal￿ (2002), implying an
average duration of price contracts of one year. In the baseline calibration, following
Campolmi and Faia (2006) and Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006), we set the degree of real wage
rigidity ￿i equal to 0:5.
Following Campolmi and Faia (2006) and Walsh (2005), we adopt an interest rate rule
for monetary policy where the central bank responds to in￿ ation but not to the output
gap. Furthermore, we assume that the degree of inertia in the policy rule ￿m equals 0:9,
a value consistent with the empirical evidence on policy rules48.
Shocks: we assume that wage shocks are as persistent as productivity shocks (￿i
w =
￿i
a = 0:9). Following Walsh (2005), we set the standard deviation of the policy shock
￿" = 0:002 and the standard deviation of productivity shocks to ￿i
a = 0:01. We have no
reference value for the standard deviation of wage shocks; to facilitate comparisons, we
assume the standard deviation of wage shocks is equal to the one of productivity shocks,
i.e. ￿i
w = 0:01.
9 The Dynamics of the Currency Union
In this section we describe the dynamic behaviour of the model in response to three types of
shocks: two asymmetric supply shocks (wage and productivity shocks) and one symmetric
demand shock (monetary policy shock). We start explaining the behaviour of the economy
under the baseline calibration, which represents the simple and highly special case of a
46In order to calibrate ’
i, Blanchard and Gali exploit a simple mapping between their model and the
standard search and matching model. See Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006), p. 28.
47To pin down B






48See, e.g, Clarida et al. (2000).
30currency union composed by symmetric countries. We then introduce some elements of
asymmetry, looking ￿rst at the impact of di⁄erent degrees of real wage rigidities and then
analysing what happens when the two regions are characterized by di⁄erent labor market
institutions.
9.1 The ￿Perfect Symmetry￿Case
Under the baseline calibration, the two regions are exactly symmetric and the transmission
mechanism of shocks is identical. Fig. 2 shows the impact of an unexpected wage increase
in the Home country. A wage increase forces the ￿rms to rise prices and to reduce the
quantities produced. On impact, union-wide in￿ ation increases by 0:1 percent, and then
decreases smoothly towards the equilibrium level. More interesting it is the behaviour
of union-wide unemployment: the corresponding impulse response function displays a
prominent hump-shaped dynamic and is highly persistent. The e⁄ect of the shock is
not very strong, as unemployment reaches a maximum of 0:15 after 5 quarters, but it is
very prolonged - after 40 quarters it has not disappeared. The persistency comes from
the interaction of some realistic elements in our framework: labor market imperfections,
nominal prices and real wages rigidities, the persistence in the monetary policy rule and an
exclusive focus of the central bank on in￿ ation. The interaction of these features amplify
considerably the persistency of otherwise transitory shocks. As it can be observed in the
second and the third quadrant, it is the Home country (i.e. the country hit by the shock)
that absorb nearly all the e⁄ect of the shock. Unemployment and in￿ ation movements in
the Foreign country are very small. Accordingly, in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials
tend to be quite large and (especially with respect to unemployment) very persistent49.
Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Wage Shock in the Home Country
49A di⁄erent monetary policy rule, that puts a lower weight on in￿ ation and a higher weight on un-
employment, would partially modify these results, increasing the response of in￿ ation while decreasing
unemployment ￿ uctuations.
31Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in the Home Country
Figure 4: Impulses Responses to a common Monetary Policy Shock
32Fig. 3 displays the responses of unemployment and in￿ ation to a positive technology
shock in the Home country. On impact, union in￿ ation decreases while unemployment
increases. The latter is due to the presence of price rigidity. Because of the price stickyness
assumption, not all ￿rms are able to reduce prices as they would have done under ￿ exible
prices. The productivity increase allows ￿rms that cannot reset prices to produce the same
amount with less work; consequently, unemployment rises on impact. This unemployment
increase is shortlived, as over time more ￿rms can reset their prices and the e⁄ect of the
productivity shock fades away.
Contrary to wage shocks, productivity changes in one country have a large spillover
e⁄ect in the other country. As shown in the second and the third quadrant of Fig. 3,
an asymmetric productivity shock in one country generates in￿ ation and unemployment
dynamics which are very similar among the two countries. The reason for these larger
spillovers lies in the fact that productivity shocks in￿ uence the terms of trade much more
than wage shocks50. Accordingly, in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials are now much
smaller - even if equally persistent.
Fig. 4 shows the response of the economies following a one percent unexpected decrease
of the nominal interest rate. On impact, union in￿ ation increases while unemployment
decreases. Since the two countries are symmetric, the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy is identical and in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials do not arise.
9.2 Di⁄erent Degrees of Real Wage Rigidities
Let now introduce a ￿rst element of asymmetry between the two countries. Speci￿cally, we
assume that in the Home country real wages are more sticky, i.e. respond less to market
forces, than in the Foreign country:
Degree of real wage rigidity at Home ￿ = 0:9
Degree of real wage rigidity at Foreign ￿￿ = 0:5
What happens when the two countries have di⁄erent degrees of real wage rigidities?
Fig. 5 shows the impulse response functions following wage shocks at Home (￿rst
column) and at Foreign (second column). Qualitatively, the dynamics are very similar to
the ￿perfect simmetry￿case. However, the e⁄ects of the shocks are now larger, since both
union unemployment and union in￿ ation tend to be more responsive to shocks.
When the member countries have di⁄erent degrees of real rigidities, it does matter
where the shock materialize. In the Home country, as wages cannot easily adjust, shocks
tend to have larger real e⁄ects than in the Foreign country. As in Christo⁄el and Linz-
ert (2005), wage rigidities, by limiting the adjustment capabilities of wages, increase the
business cycle ￿ uctuations of unemployment and output. This is true not only at the
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While a wage shock in￿ uences the terms of trade only through variation in (un)employment, a produc-
tivity shock has not only a indirect e⁄ect, through Nt and N
￿
t , but also a direct e⁄ect, as it enters directly
in the expression for St.
33union level but also for what concerns di⁄erentials: a higher degree of real wage rigidities
substantially increases the size and persistence of in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials.
Similar conclusions, as can be seen by analyzing Fig. 6, hold with respect to productiv-
ity shocks. A positive productivity shock in the Home country generates, in the medium
term, a large and persistent unemployment decrease at Home; when a similar shock hits
the Foreign country, instead, medium run unemployment in both country is only slightly
a⁄ected. Therefore, unemployment ￿ uctuations, as well as in￿ ation and unemployment
di⁄erentials, are much larger when the shock hit the ￿rigid wages￿country. Notice, in
particular, that unemployment di⁄erentials after a Home productivity shock are 4 time
bigger than unemployment di⁄erentials after a Foreign productivity shock.
The presence of di⁄erent degrees of real wage rigidities deeply a⁄ects the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy (Fig. 7). After the common monetary policy shock,
unemployment ￿ uctuations are larger in the Home country while in￿ ation reacts more in
the Foreign country. As a consequence, large di⁄erentials arises: on impact, both in￿ a-
tion and output di⁄erentials are larger than 1 percentage point. This result con￿rms the
old intuition that a common symmetric shock can have large asymmetric e⁄ects when the
countries have di⁄erent economic structures. Note however that while in￿ ation di⁄erentials
decrease rapidly, unemployment di⁄erentials are large and quite persistent51.
9.3 The Role of Labor Market Imperfections
After having analyzed the role of di⁄erent degrees of wage stickyness, in this section we
study the role of labor market imperfections. Speci￿cally, we assume that Home is the
￿rigid￿country, i.e. the country that has more sclerotic labor markets. Foreign is instead
the ￿￿ exible￿country, where ￿￿ exibility￿means higher job-￿nding and separation rates.
The parameters are calibrated as shown in the following table:52
Job-Finding rate xi Separation rate ￿i Natural unemployment
Home 0:3 0:048 0:10
Foreign 0:6 0:096 0:06
Fig. 8 and 9 display, respectively, the responses of in￿ ation and unemployment to wage
and productivity shocks. The asymmetries generated by di⁄erent labor market institutions
are smaller than the ones generated by di⁄erent degrees of real wage rigidities, but they are
still not negligeable. Interestingly, unemployment ￿ uctuations are larger in the ￿￿ exible￿
51This result partly depends on the characteristics of our model, that displays persistence on the quantity
side but not on the price side. Notice that it would be easy to generate in￿ ation persistence (and a
backward looking term for in￿ ation in the Phillips Curve) by simply assuming that the wage norm in









t . With this speci￿cation of the wage rule, which can be written in log-linear form as




t , we would obtain a hybrid Phillips Curve. To avoid tractability problems,
we have chosen not to introduce this element in our framework.
52As in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006), we calibrate the value of the job-￿nding rate and of the un-









. Notice also that in these simulations, to insulate the impact of di⁄erent labor
market institutions, we have set the real wage rigidities in Home and Foreign as in the baseline calibration,
i.e. ￿ = ￿
￿ = 0:5.
34Figure 5: Impulse Responses to Asymmetric Wage Shocks
Figure 6: Impulse Responses to Asymmetric Productivity Shocks
35Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
country - the Foreign country in our case. Intuitively, when hiring costs are high and job
turnovers are low, a ￿rm ￿nds it relatively more costly to hire new workers. Therefore,
when a wage or a productivity shock hit the economy, it is relatively more convenient for
the ￿rm to absorb the shock by changing prices than by changing the quantities produced.
A ￿sclerotic￿ economy thus tends to be characterized by higher in￿ ation volatility and
lower unemployment volatility.
Fig. 10 shows the impulse responses to a one percent decrease of the nominal interest
rate. Following a common interest rate shock, unemployment reacts more in the ￿ exible
country, while in￿ ation on impact increases faster at Home - but then it also dies out more
rapidly. The di⁄erentials generated by a monetary policy shock can be substantial: on
impact, unemployment and in￿ ation di⁄erentials increase by more than 2%.
9.4 Discussion
Several interesting results emerge from the previous analysis.
First, when monetary policy is exclusively focused on in￿ ation stabilization, asymmet-
ric wage or productivity shocks may have very long-lasting e⁄ects on unemployment, both
at the union level and at the country level. Under the baseline calibration, an asymmetric
unexpected wage increase has still some e⁄ect after 40 quarters. This persistency comes
from some realistic assumptions of our framework: nominal prices and real wage rigidities,
interest rate smoothing in monetary policy, the presence of labor market imperfections.
Second, even when the countries have similar structures, large and long-lasting di⁄er-
entials can arise as a consequence of asymmetric shocks. The size of these di⁄erentials is
in￿ uenced by the degree of real wage rigidities and by labor market institutionals para-
36Figure 8: Impulse Responses to Asymmetric Wage Shocks
Figure 9: Impulse Responses to Asymmetric Productivity Shocks
37Figure 10: Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
meters. Interestingly, productivity shocks in our model have larger spillover e⁄ects than
wage shocks and, accordingly, tend to generate smaller di⁄erentials.
Third and most importantly, understanding the labor market structure and the sources
of rigidities in the wage determination mechanism is crucial. These rigidities have an im-
portant impact on the overall behaviour of an economy and, in particular, on the trasmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy. Interestingly, the simulations show that not all sources
of rigidity have the same e⁄ects. It does make a di⁄erence whether the rigidity lies in the
wage determination mechanism or in the labor market structure. To understand this
point, consider Fig 11, which show the implied volatilities of the key variables under two
alternative calibrations. In the ￿rst table Home and Foreign, as in section 9.2, di⁄er in
the degree of real wage rigidity; in the second, they di⁄er in the degree of labor market
imperfections - as in section 9.3.
A key fact emerges: the relative size of business cycle ￿ uctuations depends substantially
on the source of the rigidity:
1. A higher degree of real wage rigidities ampli￿es the response of the real economy
to shocks. Unemployment volatility in the ￿rigid wages￿ country is much higher
than in the ￿￿ exible wages￿country. The real wage rigidities, in fact, limit wage
adjustments and shift the labor market adjustment from prices to quantities. If the
rigidity is in the wage determination mechanism, the ￿rigid￿country is more volatile.
2. A country that has more sclerotic labor markets typically experiences a lower unem-
ployment volatility, and a higher in￿ ation volatility. Intuitively, when labor markets
are rigid, it is more costly for the ￿rm to hire new people and therefore unemploy-
ment does not vary as much as it would in a more ￿ exible economy. If the rigidity
lies in the labor market, the country is less volatile, since in this case are ￿quantities￿
that cannot adjust.































) 0,23 0,47 0,40 0,32 0,87 1,02
ıʌu
) 0,15 0,50 0,36 0,37 1,22 1,32
ı(Uu
) 1,23 0,85 1,25 0,70 2,14 2,57
ı(Uu
) 0,67 0,61 0,61 0,65 2,01 2,16
ı(ToT)
2,04 1,23 2,15 0,74 0,64 2,48
ı(ToT)
1,25 0,43 0,86 0,94 0,70 1,44
ı(i)
0,47 0,69 0,67 0,44 0,90 1,20
ı(i)
0,27 0,51 0,39 0,41 0,82 0,98
ıʌH
) 0,37 0,53 0,58 0,27 0,77 1,01
ıʌH
) 0,17 0,58 0,45 0,38 1,47 1,58
ı(UH
) 1,19 1,27 2,12 0,48 2,22 3,13
ı(UH
) 0,76 0,48 0,82 0,33 1,50 1,71
ıʌF
) 0,22 0,42 0,28 0,37 0,98 1,10
ıʌF
) 0,22 0,45 0,28 0,40 1,02 1,13
ı(UF
) 0,87 0,50 0,36 0,91 1,73 2,00
ı(UF
) 0,92 0,70 0,49 1,01 2,21 2,44
Flexible VS Rigid Wages Flexible VS Rigid Labor Markets







Home (Rigid Labor Markets)
The implications of real wage rigidities and labor market imperfections for business
cycle ￿ ucuations are thus likely to operate in opposite directions. This is a very intuitive
result, as (loosely speaking) in the ￿rst case the rigidity is on the ￿labor prices￿side, while
in the second are ￿labor quantities￿that cannot adjust.
Furthermore, we have shown that when member countries have di⁄erent labor market
structures, symmetric shocks can have substantial asymmetric e⁄ects and lead to large
di⁄erentials. As shown in Fig. 11, the impact of common monetary policy shocks may
di⁄er substantially when the member countries have di⁄erent degrees of wage stickyness
or labor market institutions.
These results have strong policy implications. They suggest that the central bank may
bene￿t from closely monitoring the development of labor markets in member countries,
as this would permit a deeper understanding of the transmission mechanism of shocks in
general, and of monetary policy in particular53. Moreover, they suggest that a monetary
policy strategy that gives equal weights to di⁄erent countries may not be optimal. As we
have shown, when member countries have di⁄erent economic structures, it does make a
di⁄erence where the shock takes place. For instance, a shock that takes place in the ￿rigid
wages￿ country generates much larger union-wide in￿ ation and unemployment ￿ uctua-
tions than an equal shock that hit the ￿￿ exible wages￿country. The central bank would
presumably bene￿t from giving more weight, in its monetary policy rule, to the country
whose functioning creates more distortions - the ￿rigid wages￿country in our example.54
A more rigorous discussion of these important implications is beyond the scope of this
53See, e.g., Christo⁄el and Linzert (2005) for a similar claim.
54See Benigno (2004) for a similar argument. Benigno shows that, when the degree of nominal rigidities
in the regions forming a currency union is not equal, it is not optimal to give equal weights to the two
regions in the monetary policy rule. Instead, an in￿ ation targeting policy in which higher weight is given
to the in￿ ation in the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal.
39paper and we leave it to future research.
10 Comparing Monetary Policy Rules
Which is the impact of monetary policy on the functioning of the currency union? In this
section we try to tackle this question by comparing three simple monetary policy rules.
The Pure In￿ation Targeting (IT) strategy represents the extreme case of a central
bank that seeks to stabilize in￿ ation at all horizons, setting ^ ￿U
t = 0 at all t. Under a Pure
Output (or Unemployment) Targeting (OT) strategy, on the contrary, the central bank
only cares about unemployment and, by setting ~ uA
t = ~ nU
t = ~ yU
t = 0 at all t, stabilizes
the gap between unemployment and its e¢ cient level. The third strategy represents the
intermediate case of a central bank that cares about both in￿ ation and unemployment.
Speci￿cally, we assume the central bank sets the nominal rate following the standard
Taylor rule:
^ {t = 1:5~ ￿U
t ￿ 0:5~ uA
t (80)
Throughout this analysis, we assume the Home and Foreign regions di⁄er in both the
degree of wage rigidities and in the labor market structure, with the Home country being
more ￿rigid￿in both sense. Speci￿cally, we assume:55
Job-Finding rate xi Separation rate ￿i Unemployment Wage Rigidities ￿i
Home 0:3 0:048 0:10 0:7
Foreign 0:6 0:096 0:06 0:4
Fig. 12 shows the response of union-wide variables to an unexpected wage increase in
the Home country56. If the Central Bank completely stabilizes unemployment, union-wide
in￿ ation rises by 0:40 points on impact, and then decreases very slowly towards equilib-
rium. Under a pure IT strategy, instead, the monetary authority completely stabilizes
union-wide in￿ ation, but at the cost of quite high and persistent unemployment ￿ uctua-
tions. Union unemployment reaches a peak increase of almost 0:35 after 3 quarters and
then start to decrease.
Of course, there is no reason why the central bank would want to respond to a shock
by allowing only in￿ ation or unemployment ￿ uctuations. As long as the central bank cares
about both unemployment and in￿ ation ￿ uctuations, she would spread the costs of the
adjustment among the two variables. The ￿rst panel in Fig. 12 shows the response of
union-wide variables under the Taylor rule. As the Taylor rule divides the burden of ad-
justment between the two variables, the impulse responses of in￿ ation and unemployment
are very similar. Both variable display a peak increase of about 0:2 after two quarters,
and then decrease smoothly towards equilibrium. Notice that in each of the three cases,
the impulse responses of the adjusting variables remain above the initial values well after
the shock has vanished.
55The main results of this section hold also in the perfect symmetry case. We have chosen to show the
asymmetric case because both more interesting and more realistic.
56In this section, since all types of shocks provides similar insights, we only show the e⁄ects of Home
wage shock.
40Figure 12: Comparing di⁄erent policy rules: Home Wage shock - Union Level
Figure 13: Comparing di⁄erent policy rules: Home Wage shock - Country Level






































ıʌu) 0,54 0,45 0,56 0,42 0,69 1,16 0,67 1,08 0,78 1,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
ı(Uu) 0,54 0,21 0,47 0,34 0,58 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,92 0,54 0,85 0,68 1,11 ı(ToT)
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ıʌH) 0,57 0,47 0,62 0,39 0,72 1,17 0,68 1,14 0,73 1,35 0,14 0,05 0,12 0,10 0,15
ı(UH) 0,85 0,39 0,90 0,15 0,91 0,59 0,21 0,46 0,43 0,59 1,17 0,69 1,30 0,30 1,40
ıʌF) 0,55 0,44 0,52 0,47 0,69 1,16 0,65 1,03 0,84 1,32 0,14 0,05 0,12 0,10 0,15
ı(UF) 0,72 0,18 0,21 0,71 0,72 0,61 0,22 0,48 0,45 0,62 0,92 0,38 0,29 1,00 1,02
Taylor rule Output Targeting
Union Level
Home (Rigid Wages and Labor Markets)
Inflation  Targeting
Shocks Shocks Shocks
Foreign (Flex Wages and Labor Markets)
Fig. 14, which displays the implied volatilities of the key variables under di⁄erent
shocks and policy rules, con￿rms this basic result: in the model, an important trade-o⁄
between unemployment and in￿ ation stabilization arises. A pure in￿ ation stabilization
strategy leads to a large unemployment volatility; similarly, a pure output targeting strat-
egy entails the cost of high in￿ ation volatility. The Taylor rule makes a balance of the
two, and trades some unemployment volatility with some in￿ ation volatility. Notice that
interest rate volatility is ￿ve time larger under a pure OT strategy than under a pure IT
strategy.
Di⁄erent monetary policy rules does not seem to have a big impact on di⁄erentials, as
the dynamics of in￿ ation and unemployment di⁄erentials under the three rules are very
similar. Interestingly, unemployment di⁄erentials in our model are always much larger
and more persistent than in￿ ation di⁄erentials.
Turning at the country level (see Fig. 13 and Fig.14 ), a strict in￿ ation targeting
strategy stabilizes in￿ ation at the union level, but not at the country level The same is
true for unemployment under a strict unemployment stabilization policy. Notice however
that while in￿ ation ￿ uctuations under pure IT are small, a pure output targeting strategy
leads to non-negligeable unemployment ￿ uctuations at the country level.
Di⁄erent degrees of real rigidities in the two economies deeply in￿ uence the volatilities
of the two regions. Asymmetric regions react di⁄erently to similar shocks. Interestingly,
under our calibration, whether the Home country has larger business cycle ￿ uctuations
than Foreign depends on the policy rule implemented. Unemployment ￿ uctuations at
Home are larger than at Foreign under the Taylor rule and the pure IT strategy; the
opposite is true under pure unemployment targeting. Intuitively, di⁄erent labor market
structures or wage determination mechanisms in￿ uence the slopes of the Phillips curves
of the two countries. Di⁄erent monetary policy rules may exploit this asymmetry and
produce di⁄erent results.57
57See Blanchard-Gal￿ (2006), p. 31, for a similar point.
4211 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced labor market frictions and real wage rigidities in a
standard DSGE currency union model. The model provides a rigorous, but still tractable,
framework for the analysis of the functioning of a currency union characterised by pervasive
nominal and real rigidities.
As in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2006), labor market frictions are introduced by assuming
the presence of hiring costs, which increase in the degree of labor market tightness. The
introduction of hiring costs has two important consequences. First, it leads to involuntary
unemployment. Second, it fundamentally changes the nature of marginal costs, which
now depends not only on the evolution of real wages and productivity, but also on the
evolution of marginal hiring costs. The presence of real wage rigidities, on the other side,
hinders wage adjustments and hence increases the adjustments on the labor quantity side.
The degree of labor market frictions and real wage rigidities, by in￿ uencing the incentives
and constraints faced by ￿rms, signi￿cantly a⁄ect the transmission mechanism of shocks
in general, and of monetary policy in particular.
In the presence of real wage rigidities or exogenous wage shocks, strict in￿ ation tar-
geting is not optimal, as it entails large and persistent unemployment ￿ uctuations, both
at the union and at the country level.
The presence of real rigidities considerably ampli￿es the persistency of transitory
shocks and helps to explain the existence of long-lasting in￿ ation and unemployment
di⁄erentials. Moreover, when member countries have di⁄erent labor market institutions,
symmetric shocks (in our case, monetary policy shocks) can have large asymmetric e⁄ects.
Finally, it does make a di⁄erence if the rigidities lies in the wage determination mech-
anism or in the labor market structure. The implications of real wage rigidities and labor
market frictions for business cycle ￿ uctuations are in fact likely to operate in opposite
directions: a high degree of real wage rigidities tends to amplify the response of the real
economy to shocks; when labor market are more sclerotic, instead, unemployment volatil-
ity tends to decrease while in￿ ation volatility increases.
All these results suggest that understanding the labor market structures and the
sources of rigidities in the wage determination mechanism is crucial for policy analysis.
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45Appendix: Key Conditions for the Foreign Country
A. 1: The Social Planner Problem



































It can be shown that the optimal level of employment does not depend on productivity,









E is the e¢ cient level for the tightness indicator for the foreign country, im-
plicitely given as the solution to the optimality condition for N￿
t .












A. 2: Equilibrium under Flexible Prices
The following conditions hold for Foreign under ￿ exible prices:








































































46A. 3: Nash Bargained Wages




































































As for Home - and for the same reasons - the employment level is constant in an
equilibrium with Nash Bargaining.










’ (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) (94)
The equilibrium wage moves one for one with A￿
t(SH
t )￿. Productivity shocks at Home
or at Foreign are completely neutralized by changes in the wage rate and thus do not a⁄ect
the unemployment level, which is unchanged.
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